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INTRODUCTION 
It is a great honor for me to deliver the Helen Wilson Nies Memorial 
Lecture in Intellectual Property Law at Marquette University Law School.  I 
want to begin with a few words about Judge Nies.  I had the good fortune of 
speaking with Judge Nies about her career years ago when she returned to her 
alma mater, the University of Michigan Law School, and gave a guest lecture 
to my patent law class.   
Judge Nies was a distinguished alumna who graduated Order of the Coif in 
the Class of 1948, and we are very proud of her at Michigan.  She had a 
distinguished career in trademark law before her appointment to the federal 
bench in 1980.  When the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created 
in 1982, she became one of its first judges, and eventually served as chief judge.  
Although the Federal Circuit is often viewed as a specialized patent court, prior 
to her appointment Judge Nies had little background in patent law.2  But of 
course, patent law is still law, and Judge Nies was an excellent lawyer, so she 
rolled up her sleeves and figured it out.  I admire that fearlessness, especially 
at a relatively late career stage.  Rarely can individuals see where their career 
will take them, and if we want to take advantage of new opportunities—or 
 
1. Robert & Barbara Luciano Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. This 
research was supported by the William W. Cook endowment of the University of Michigan Law 
School. My understanding of this topic owes much to a collaborative project with Harold Varmus. See 
Rebecca Eisenberg & Harold Varmus, Insurance for broad genomic tests in oncology, 358 SCIENCE 
1133 (2017). 
2.  Her husband, John Nies, was also a Michigan law grad and patent lawyer. 
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simply provide the advice clients require in an ever-changing world—from 
time to time we all need to roll up our sleeves and learn something new. 
Among Judge Nies’s lasting contributions to the Federal Circuit were her 
early opinions on legal process and procedural issues.3  These decisions were 
vital to the new court’s mission to consolidate appellate jurisdiction over patent 
law and to standardize its interpretation.4  Judge Nies’s opinions on burden of 
proof, standard of review, the role of juries, and the authority of prior opinions 
of other courts are still cited today, while many substantive decisions of her 
Federal Circuit brethren from the same era have been overturned by subsequent 
decisions of the Supreme Court.5  The enduring significance to the patent 
system of these process issues reminds us that patent law is not an island apart 
from the rest of the legal system.  It works alongside other bodies of law, and 
operates through rules for administrative and judicial practice that are not 
unique to patent law. 
The primary focus of my patent scholarship has been biomedical 
innovation.  Patent law is often credited with motivating investments in 
biomedical innovation, particularly from the pharmaceutical industry, which 
relies heavily on patent protection and works hard to strengthen patent laws 
throughout the world.  But patent law does not work alone.  This is a lesson I 
keep learning.  Other sources of legal regulation provide crucial assistance 
when patent law would otherwise fail to achieve its goals. 
Today, I examine the intersection of patent law, FDA regulation, and 
Medicare coverage in a particularly promising field of biomedical innovation: 
genetic diagnostic testing.  First, I will discuss current clinical uses of genetic 
testing and directions for further research, with a focus on cancer, the field in 
which genetic testing has had the greatest impact to date.  Second, I will turn to 
patent law and address two recent Supreme Court decisions that called into 
question the patentability of many of the most important advances in genetic 
testing.6  Third, I will step outside patent law to take a broader view of the legal 
environment for new developments in genetic testing, with a focus on two 
federal regulatory agencies: the Food & Drug Administration (FDA), which 
regulates new drugs and medical devices under statutory standards for safety 
and effectiveness; and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), 
 
3.  See Stephen A. Soffen, Hon. Helen W. Nies – A Conscientious Jurist Who Led the court in 
Defining the Role of Juries in Patent Cases, 8 J. FED. CIR. HIST. SOC’Y 97, 97–99 (2014) (examining 
Judge Nies’ opinions on the role of the jury, summary judgment, and standard of review). 
4.  See id.; Helen W. Nies, The Federal Circuit: A Court for the Future, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 571, 
571 (1992). 
5.  See Soffen, supra note 3, at 100–01. 
6.  This is how I came to this topic as a patent scholar. I was worried that the absence of patent 
protection might undermine incentives for innovation in this important field. 
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which sets reimbursement policies for Medicare under statutory standards that 
limit coverage to technologies that are reasonable and necessary. 
Last, with this background, I will explain a recent surprising development: 
developers of next generation sequencing (NGS) diagnostic tests for tumor 
DNA have begun seeking FDA approval or clearance for tests they are at liberty 
to provide, and in fact have already begun to provide, without asking FDA for 
permission.  The answer lies in understanding the rules and practices that 
govern health insurance coverage and the important role of FDA in assessment 
of new technologies.  This episode sheds an interesting light on the roles and 
interactions of different sources of legal regulation in supporting innovation 
outside the patent system. 
I. CURRENT TRENDS IN GENETIC TESTING AND A SHIFT IN CANCER 
DIAGNOSES 
Advances in genetics and molecular biology have transformed scientific 
understanding of the basis of many diseases, identifying new molecular targets 
for therapy and rearranging diagnostic categories.  Nowhere are these 
developments more striking than in cancer.  Traditional cancer diagnosis 
focuses on the tissue of origin of a tumor. Caregivers look to the tissue of origin 
to specify what type of a cancer a patient has, and then consider different 
treatment options depending on whether the patient has breast cancer, colon 
cancer, lung cancer, etc. But increasingly it appears that what really matters is 
not so much the tissue of origin, but the genetic mutation that is driving the 
tumor. 
Studies to date have revealed hundreds of genes in which mutations 
associated with cancer arise.7  Some of these mutations are common and well 
understood, while others are rare, and their role in cancer remains unclear.8  
Drug companies have developed a new generation of “targeted therapies” that 
are designed to work against tumors that have specific mutations.9  Sometimes 
these targeted therapeutic products are developed and submitted to FDA for 
approval along with a “companion diagnostic” test to detect the targeted 
mutation.10 
 
7.  A catalogue of these genes is maintained at Cancer Gene Census, Catalogue of Somatic 
Mutations in Cancer, http://cancer.sanger.ac.uk/census#cl_search [https://perma.cc/974D-K537]. 
8.  See id. 
9.  Nickolas Papadopoulos, Kenneth W. Kinzler & Bert Vogelstein, The role of companion 
diagnostics in the 
development and use of mutation-targeted cancer therapies, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 985, 985 
(2006). 
10.  U.S. Food & Drug Admin., In Vitro Companion Diagnostic Devices: Guidance for Industry 
and Food and Drug Administration Staff 5–6 (2014), 
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FDA-approved indications for targeted therapeutics may specify tissue of 
origin as well as the genetic mutation targeted by the drug.  An example is the 
drug Herceptin® (trastuzumab), one of the earliest FDA-approved targeted 
cancer therapies.11  Initially, FDA approved the drug “for treatment of patients 
with metastatic breast cancer whose tumors overexpress the HER2 protein and 
who have received one or more chemotherapy regimens for their metastatic 
disease.”12  Later, FDA expanded the approved indications to include treatment 
of patients with tumors from other tissues that have the same genetic signature, 
specifically “the treatment of patients with HER2-overexpressing metastatic 
gastric or gastroesophageal junction adenocarcinoma.”13  Although breast 
cancer and gastroesophageal cancer arise in different types of tissues, if the 
resulting tumors are overexpressing the HER2 protein, both groups of patients 
are candidates for treatment with the same targeted drug.14  In 2017, for the first 
time, FDA expanded the approved indications for another targeted cancer drug, 
Keytruda® (pembrolizumab), to include all tumors with the specified genetic 
profile, regardless of tissue of origin.15  In the future, the most meaningful 
information for diagnosis of cancer type and selection of treatment may no 
longer be tissue of origin, but rather results of genetic testing.16  However, much 
work remains to be done to understand the significance of different mutations 
in driving different cancers. 
Meanwhile, the cost of more extensive DNA sequencing has fallen 
significantly with the advent of next generation sequencing (NGS) technology, 
which makes it feasible to derive more information from a single DNA sample 
quickly and at little incremental cost relative to narrower tests that only look 




11.  Papadopoulos et al., supra note 9, at 989. 
12.  Letter from Jay P. Siegel to Robert L. Garnick (Sept. 25, 1998), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/1998/trasgen092598L.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TP3N-DUK9]. 
13.  See current label for Herceptin® (trastuzumab) at 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2016/103792s5330lbl.pdf (revised Mar. 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/BGF5-55YE]. 
14.  Id. 
15.  FDA News Release, FDA approves first cancer treatment for any solid tumor with a 
specific genetic feature (May 23, 2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm560167.htm 
[https://perma.cc/R8ZW-9HNG]. 
16.  David M. Hyman, Barry S. Taylor, & Jose Baselga, Implementing Genome-Driven 
Oncology, 168 CELL 584, 584 (2017). 
17.  Erwin L. VanDijk et al., Ten years of next-generation sequencing technology, 30 TRENDS 
IN GENETICS 418, 418–19 (2014). 
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genetic testing for cancer patients.  In 1998, when Herceptin was first approved 
for treatment of HER2/neu overexpressing breast cancer,18 it seemed sensible 
to test tumor DNA from breast cancer patients only for the particular aberration 
that would indicate a likely response to Herceptin.  But today, with a larger set 
of targeted therapies available against different mutations and with the ability 
to sequence more DNA at lower cost, it is questionable whether such limited 
testing still makes sense.  For a modest incremental cost, it is now possible to 
fully sequence, a DNA sample from a patient’s tumor, the 350–400 genes 
known to be associated with cancer, making it possible to screen patients for 
multiple treatments at once.  Even if no targeted therapies exist for the 
mutations that are found in a patient’s tumor DNA, such testing could shed light 
on the patient’s diagnostic odyssey.19  It could also contribute to understanding 
of cancer by illuminating the mutations that may be causing particular tumors.20  
Multiple laboratories now offer such tests, both in academic medical centers 
and in commercial firms. 
II. PROCESS PATENTABILITY AND THE SUPREME COURT 
The proliferation of new tests suggests a flourishing of innovation in the 
field of genetic testing, despite recent developments in patent law that have cast 
serious doubt on the patentability of many of the most important advances in 
DNA diagnostics.  Doubts about patentability arise from two U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions. 
First was the Court’s 2012 decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Laboratories.21  The patent at issue claimed a diagnostic algorithm 
that involved observing a biomarker and then drawing a diagnostic inference 
about the patient’s need for treatment.22  More specifically, the patent claimed 
a method of optimizing treatment with thiopurine drugs by measuring levels of 
certain drug metabolites in a patient’s blood and determining on that basis 
whether the drug dosage needs to be adjusted.23  A patient’s body produces 
metabolites as the body breaks down a drug after ingesting it.  The patent 
recited both a lower level of drug metabolites that would indicate a need for a 
higher dosage of the drug (to be sure that it is therapeutically effective) and an 
upper level that would indicate a need to lower the dosage (to minimize toxic 
 
18.  See Siegel, supra note 12, at 1. 
19.  See Hyman et al., supra note 16, at 585. 
20.  Id. at 585–86. 
21.  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 66–67 (2012) (noting 
that the patent at issue involved “the use of thiopurine drugs to treat autoimmune diseases.”). 
22.  Kevin E. Collins, Prometheus Laboratories, Mental Steps, and Printed Matter, 50 
HOUSTON L. REV. 391, 398 (2012). 
23.  Id. at 399. 
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side effects).24  The Supreme Court held that the patent claims were invalid 
because the metabolite levels that would indicate a need to adjust the dosage of 
the drug are unpatentable “natural laws,” and once those natural laws are 
excluded, the remaining steps in the claim were not sufficiently novel to count 
as a patentable invention.25  Although it may have been possible to interpret 
this decision narrowly, a fair reading of the Court’s analysis seems to count all 
predictions regarding the effects of treatment in patients as “natural laws.”26  
Subsequent decisions have read the Mayo decision broadly, dealing a major 
blow to patenting strategies for innovative diagnostic tests.27 
The next year the Supreme Court dealt another major blow to patentability 
of DNA diagnostics with its decision in Association for Molecular Pathology 
v. Myriad Genetics.28  The patent at issue in that case claimed DNA molecules 
with sequences corresponding to the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes associated 
with susceptibility to developing breast cancer.29  The Supreme Court held that 
the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, as they exist in patients’ cells, are unpatentable 
because they are natural products.30  Again, although it might be possible to 
read the opinion more narrowly, a fair reading of the Court’s analysis seems to 
count all naturally occurring DNA biomarkers used in genetic testing as 
“natural products.”31 
Considered together, these two decisions cast considerable doubt on the 
patentability of both the biomarkers and the associated diagnostic predictions 
involved in genetic diagnostic testing.  Subsequent lower court decisions have 
offered little reason to expect that these decisions will be narrowly interpreted.32 
III. GENETIC TESTING AND FEDERAL REGULATION 
What does doubtful patentability mean for incentives for investment in 
development of genetic diagnostic tests?  If the conventional wisdom for the 
 
24.  Id. at 398. 
25.  Id. at 403.  For a fuller analysis and critique of this opinion, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 BOSTON U.J. SCI. & TECH. L. 256, 264–70 (2015). 
26.  See id. at 266. 
27.  See Ariosa Diagnostics v. Sequenom, 788 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016). 
28.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. 576, 576 (2013) (holding “a 
naturally occurring DNA segment is . . . not patent eligible.”). 
29.  Id. 
30.  Id. at 580. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Anne Paxton, AMP v. Myriad: driving or disrupting innovation? (2017), 
http://www.captodayonline.com/amp-v-myriad-driving-disrupting-innovation/ 
[https://perma.cc/864Y-FM9H]. 
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biopharmaceutical industry applies to diagnostics,33 one might worry that 
patent incentives are essential and that without reliable patent protection, 
investments in this promising field will dry up.  On the other hand, the Supreme 
Court decisions that cast doubt on the patentability of diagnostic inventions 
were applauded by some innovators in this field, especially in university 
laboratories that were eager to offer NGS testing to examine a great many genes 
in a single test, without having to worry about multiple patent holders trying to 
stop them.34  Perhaps innovation in genetic testing is different from the 
paradigm case of new drug development, the example long used to illustrate 
the need for patents to preserve incentives for new product development.  
Perhaps patents are less necessary, or even counterproductive, for incentives to 
develop new diagnostic tests. 
One difference between diagnostics and therapeutics is the regulatory 
burden imposed on the two types of products.  The costs and risks of FDA 
regulation loom large in standard accounts of why the pharmaceutical industry 
needs patents on new drugs.35  Before a firm may lawfully sell or even ship a 
new drug in commerce, FDA must approve it under statutory standards for 
safety and efficacy based on data from clinical trials that meet stringent 
scientific standards.36  These trials are both costly and risky, with many failures 
at every stage.  Even after approval, many drugs get withdrawn from the market 
after new risks come to light.  Or after further data shows that risks were more 
substantial than was initially apparent.  Drug developers must cover the costs 
of failure with lucrative sales of successful products, and patents allow them to 
charge prices that are high enough to do that. 
The FDA has statutory authority to regulate genetic tests for safety and 
efficacy as medical devices.37  But it regulates medical devices less stringently 
than drugs.38  Medical devices are a diverse category that ranges from simple 
 
33.  See Iain Cockburn & Genia Long, The importance of patents to innovation: updated 
crossindustry comparisons with biopharmaceuticals, 25 EXPERT OPINION ON THERAPEUTIC PATENTS 
739, 739 (2015). 
34.  Anne Paxton, AMP v. Myriad: driving or disrupting innovation? (2017), 
http://www.captodayonline.com/amp-v-myriad-driving-disrupting-innovation/ 
[https://perma.cc/864Y-FM9H]. 
35.  Joseph A. DiMasi, Henry G. Grabowski, & Ronald W. Hanson, Innovation in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 26 (2016) (noting 
that for approved drugs, the “fully capitalized total cost estimate is $2558 million.”). 
36.  21 U.S.C. § 355. 
37.  U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Draft Guidance for Industry, Food and Drug Administration 
Staff, and Clinical Laboratories: Framework for Regulatory Oversight of Laboratory-Developed Tests 
(LDTs), 7 (Oct. 3, 2014), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocument
s/UCM416685.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LW9-PG2A]. 
38.  Id. at 8–9. 
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items like tongue depressors and bandages to complex implanted devices like 
cardiac pacemakers.39  The statute directs FDA to take a stratified, risk-based 
approach to device regulation, sorting devices into three classes (I, II, and III) 
according to the kinds of controls that are necessary to ensure their safety and 
effectiveness.40  Only the riskiest Class III devices require “premarket 
approval” from FDA before they may be sold, while intermediate risk Class II 
devices may be sold after a less onerous “premarket clearance” process 
(sometimes called “510(k) clearance” after the relevant statutory provision).41  
Even for Class III devices that require premarket approval, the burden and cost 
are considerably less than for premarket approval of drugs.  Whenever possible, 
FDA relies less heavily on premarket testing and more on post-approval 
monitoring and data collection to ensure safety and effectiveness for devices.42 
Sometimes the FDA regulates specific genetic tests as “companion 
diagnostics” for new drugs that target the specific mutations that these tests 
detect, approving the diagnostic and therapeutic products together.43  
Coordinated submission of data on both products can be advantageous for drug 
companies seeking approval for targeted therapies.44  Using a validated 
diagnostic to screen patients for participation in clinical trials may allow a new 
drug to get approval after trials that are smaller and shorter in duration than 
FDA would otherwise require.45  This is because the diagnostic allows the 
sponsor to design the trial to focus on patients who have the targeted mutation 
and are therefore likely to respond to the drug.46  Put differently, trial results 
 
39.  U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Classify Your Medical Device, 
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevice
/default.htm [https://perma.cc/48M3-N4WS]. 
40.  21 U.S.C. § 360c et seq. 
41.  U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Overview of Device Regulation, 
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/default.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Q9TN-FENQ]. 
42.  U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Balancing Premarket and Postmarket Data Collection for 
Devices Subject to Premarket Approval: Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration 
Staff, 6 (2015), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/u
cm393994.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4YZ-VTHM]. 
43.  U.S. Food & Drug Admin., In Vitro Companion Diagnostic Devices: Guidance for Industry 
and Food and Drug Administration Staff, 6 (2014), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocument
s/UCM262327.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LFA-N6RL]. 
44.  Papadopoulos et al., supra note 9, at 993–94. 
45.  45.  U.S. Food & Drug Admin., In Vitro Companion Diagnostic Devices: Guidance 
for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff, 8 (2014), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocument
s/UCM262327.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2JE-BAAB]. 
46.  Papadopoulos et al., supra note 9 at 993. 
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are more likely to favor a given drug if a genetic test administered before the 
trial allows a drug company to exclude patients who are unlikely to respond to 
the targeted therapy because they do not have the targeted mutation. Drug 
companies are therefore motivated to do the necessary trials to validate the 
clinical significance of diagnostics that detect these targeted mutations, whether 
or not they can patent the validated tests themselves. Validating the tests will 
expedite approval to sell the new, and presumably patented, drugs that target 
the mutations that the tests detect.47   
The FDA has generally classified companion diagnostics for targeted 
therapies as Class III medical devices, requiring premarket approval.48  But 
FDA Guidance Documents have indicated that FDA might in future cases allow 
companion diagnostic devices to use the less onerous “premarket notification” 
clearance process for Class II devices if FDA determines that such a process is 
sufficient to provide a reasonable assurance of safety and efficacy.49  As FDA 
explained in 2014: 
 
FDA will apply a risk-based approach to determine the regulatory 
pathway for IVD [in vitro diagnostic] companion diagnostic devices, as 
it does with all medical devices. This means that the regulatory pathway 
will depend on the level of risk to patients, based on the intended use 
of the IVD companion diagnostic device and the controls necessary to 
provide a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness. Thus, the 
level of risk together with available controls to mitigate risk will 
establish whether an IVD companion diagnostic device requires a 
premarket approval application (PMA) or a premarket notification 
submission (510(k)).50 
 
This is consistent with FDA’s flexible approach to device regulation.  
Although typically a new type of device that is not equivalent to any previously 
approved device will begin in Class III, requiring premarket approval,51 FDA 
may later reevaluate this classification and permit “de novo” reclassification if 
initial concerns about safety and effectiveness prove to be manageable with less 
burdensome regulatory controls.52 
 
47.  See Id. at 993–94. 
48.  U.S. Food & Drug Admin., In Vitro Companion Diagnostic Devices: Guidance for Industry 
and Food & Drug Administration Staff, 10 n.10 (2014). 
49.  Id. 
50.  Id. at 10. 
51.  Id. at 10 n.10; 21 U.S. Code § 360c(f)(1). 
52.  U.S. Food & Drug Admin., De Novo Classification Process (Evaluation of Automatic Class 
III Designation): Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff, 5 (2017), 
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Another important limitation on FDA regulation of diagnostic tests has 
provided a huge break for genetic testing laboratories without regard to their 
medical device classification.  As a matter of administrative discretion, FDA 
has so far chosen not to require approval or clearance of what it calls 
“laboratory developed tests.”53  A laboratory developed test (LDT) is a 
diagnostic test that is designed, manufactured, and used all within the same 
laboratory, rather than sold or licensed for use in other facilities.54  This is an 
old policy dating back to the 1970s that has allowed many laboratories to 
provide genetic testing services without the burden of FDA regulation.55  A few 
years ago, FDA appeared to be on the verge of reconsidering this discretionary 
policy.56  In a Draft Guidance issued in 2014, FDA proposed to use expert 
advisory committees to determine the level of risk posed by different kinds of 
LDTs and to enforce their existing authorities to regulate some kinds of LDTs 
more aggressively.57  But in the final days of the Obama administration, FDA 
put these plans on hold.58  For now at least, most laboratories that perform 
genetic testing services do not need approval or clearance for their tests from 
the FDA.  In this environment, when an applicant has sought FDA approval for 
a genetic test, it has generally been for a specific companion diagnostic product 
developed in tandem with a targeted drug and used to identify which patients 
are likely to respond to that drug. 
Meanwhile, more-comprehensive genetic tests that use NGS technology to 
examine hundreds of genes to detect mutations driving a patient’s cancer have 
become available without FDA approval or clearance.  These tests have 




53.  U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Draft Guidance for Industry, Food and Drug Administration 
Staff, and Clinical Laboratories: Framework for Regulatory Oversight of Laboratory Developed Tests, 
6 (2014). 
54.  Id. at 5. 
55.  Id. at 6. 
56.  Id. at 12. 
57.  Id. 
58.  U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Discussion Paper on Laboratory Developed Tests (LDTs), 1 
(Jan. 17, 2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/productsandmedicalprocedures/invitrodiagnostics/la
boratorydevelopedtests/ucm536965.pdf [https://perma.cc/6E7K-L557]. 
59.  See, e.g., D.T. Cheng et al., Memorial Sloan Kettering-Integrated Mutation 
Profiling of Actionable Cancer Targets (MSK-IMPACT): A Hybridization Capture-Based 
Next-Generation Sequencing Clinical Assay for Solid Tumor Molecular Oncology, 17 J. MOLECULAR 
DIAGNOSTICS 251, 251 (2015). 
60.  See, e.g., Garrett M. Frampton et al., Development and validation of a clinical cancer 
genomic profiling test based on massively parallel DNA sequencing, 31 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1023, 1024 (2013). 
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Perhaps the successful development of this new technology, in the face of 
considerable uncertainty about the availability of patents, suggests a need to 
refine the conventional wisdom about the role of patents in providing incentives 
for biomedical innovation. 
IV. LEGAL REGULATION OUTSIDE THE PATENT SYSTEM 
Before we discard the conventional wisdom, we should consider two 
explanations for why this particular technology might flourish in the absence 
of patents.  Both of these explanations are consistent with the familiar story 
from the pharmaceutical industry that it needs patents to cover high costs of 
product development.  First, perhaps innovators are willing to invest in LDTs 
only because of the FDA’s exercise of administrative discretion, at least so far, 
to refrain from regulating these products.  This explanation leaves open the 
possibility that patents may be necessary to motivate investment in more 
heavily regulated therapeutic products such as drugs.  Second, perhaps 
pharmaceutical firms are willing to invest in genetic companion diagnostic 
products because it helps them to develop and get regulatory approval for 
lucrative new patent-protected drugs targeted against specific mutations.  
Indeed, as explained earlier, development and validation of companion 
diagnostics may accelerate FDA approval of these targeted drugs. 
In both of these stories, innovators seek to avoid the costs of FDA 
regulation and are more inclined to invest in the face of lower regulatory costs 
and risks.  In this sense, these stories are also consistent with broader narratives 
about costly regulation as a drag on innovation.61 
Neither of these stories explains why laboratories that offer genetic testing 
of tumor DNA have begun to seek FDA approval of their products, even when 
it is not legally necessary because the products qualify as LDTs.  Laboratories 
are free to offer these tests without the FDA’s blessing, and in fact they are 
already lawfully offering them before they voluntarily submit applications to 
the FDA.62  Last year, the FDA approved two very similar NGS tests for LDTs 
that detect mutations in hundreds of genes in tumor DNA samples.63  One 
 
61.  DiMasi et al., supra note 35, at 26 (noting that for approved drugs, the “fully capitalized 
total cost estimate is $2558 million.”). 
62.  U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Draft Guidance for Industry, Food and Drug Administration 
Staff, and Clinical Laboratories: Framework for Regulatory Oversight of Laboratory-Developed Tests 
(LDTs), 6 (Oct. 3, 2014), (noting that the FDA does not always enforce LDT regulation), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocument
s/UCM416685.pdf [https://perma.cc/RY85-WR63]. 
63.  Letter from Reena Philip to Christine England (Nov. 15, 2017), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf17/DEN170058.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3C6-LEFZ] 
[hereinafter Philip Letter MSKCC]; Letter from Reena Philip to Christine Vietz (Nov. 30, 2017), 
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application was from Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center (MSKCC) for 
FDA clearance of its IMPACT test as a Class II device.64  The other was an 
application from a private firm, Foundation Medicine, for premarket approval 
of its Foundation One test as a Class III device.65  The choices of different 
regulatory pathways have had interesting consequences that I will consider 
soon. 
But first, why would these laboratories take upon themselves the costs and 
risks of submitting their products to FDA regulation when FDA does not 
require it?  The short answer is that health insurers were refusing to pay for 
testing.  This itself is a bit of a puzzle, since the cost of testing is trivial 
compared to the overall costs of cancer care.66  It is not obvious why insurers 
that readily pay in excess of $100,000 a year for expensive new targeted drugs 
would decline to pay a few thousand bucks up-front for testing that might reveal 
in a single test whether the patient is a candidate for any of more than a dozen 
previously approved cancer therapies.67  Some insurers are willing to cover less 
comprehensive genetic tests that focus only on clinically validated mutations 
that have been shown to predict treatment response, but not the more-
informative tests that sequence more DNA and are likely to reveal mutations of 
unknown significance in hundreds of genes.68  This position follows model 
coverage guidelines for NGS testing in oncology, as proposed in 2015 by the 
Green Park Collaborative-USA, a multi-stakeholder program hosted by the 
nonprofit Center for Medical Technology Policy.69 
Although the difference in cost between limited testing to detect particular 
validated mutations and more-comprehensive testing that will reveal many 
more mutations is small, some insurers see an important principle at stake: their 
role is to pay for clinically validated care, but not experimental care, and 
certainly not research.70  There is some truth to the charge that coverage for 
broader genetic testing would have the effect of using insurance to pay for 
 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf17/P170019a.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6MZ-GV5W] 
[hereinafter Philip Letter Foundation]. 
64.  Philip Letter MSKCC, supra note 63. 
65.  Philip Letter Foundation, supra note 63. 
66.  Rebecca Eisenberg & Harold Varmus, Insurance for Broad Genomic Tests in Oncology, 
358 SCIENCE 1133, 1134 (2017). 
67.  Id. at 1133–34. 
68.  Green Park Collaborative. Initial Medical Policy and Model Coverage Guidelines for 
Clinical Next Generation Sequencing in Oncology, 2 (Aug. 17, 2015), 
http://www.cmtpnet.org/docs/resources/Full_Release_Version_August_13__2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HU2Y-NVJ9]. 
69.  Id. 
70.  Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Shifting institutional roles in biomedical innovation in a learning 
healthcare system, 14 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 1139, 1141 (2018). 
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research.71  Although there is immediate clinical value in genetic testing to 
identify candidates for targeted therapies, there is also considerable research 
value in detecting additional mutations in genes that are known to play a role 
in cancer.72  The biological significance of these mutations may not be clear 
yet, but they are suspects that may prove to be culprits in driving cancers. 
Tracking these mutations in registries of cancer patients, along with their health 
records, would provide valuable data for researchers seeking a better 
understanding of cancer, perhaps enabling future improvements in cancer 
treatment.  NGS testing uncovers both clinically validated mutations that are 
targeted by FDA-approved drugs and other mutations of unknown significance.  
In other words, genetic testing has significant value as data collection for 
research, in addition to its immediate value in matching patients with currently 
available treatments. 
Insurers have a tradition of not paying for research, at least as a formal 
matter.73  But, in fact, insurers have always paid for innovative treatment 
choices that have not yet been validated through clinical trials.74  Even when 
FDA requires premarket testing for drugs and medical devices, substantial 
questions about clinical validity and utility may remain at the point of initial 
approval—questions that can be answered only in the course of subsequent 
clinical care.75  Many healthcare innovations do not require FDA approval at 
all.  The FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine, and caregivers are 
free to adopt new innovations in the course of clinical care without first having 
to await studies that would satisfy the FDA’s standards for proof of safety and 
efficacy.76  Insurers might balk at paying for an expensive new procedure, such 
as autologous bone marrow transplantation for cancer patients, on the grounds 
that it is experimental, but much experimental medical care flies beneath the 
radar of insurance gatekeepers and gets covered based on the choices of 
caregivers.77  Insurance coverage is especially important to facilitate innovation 
in areas that are not regulated by the FDA, because without FDA demanding 
data from clinical trials, it is less likely that innovators will collect data prior to 
 
71.  Eisenberg & Varmus, supra note 67, at 1133. 
72.  Id. 
73.  Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 1141, 1150. 
74.  Richard R. Nelson et al., How Medical Know-How Progresses, 40 RESEARCH POL’Y 1339, 
1341 (2011); Eisenberg & Varmus, supra note 67, at 1134. 
75.  U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Balancing Premarket and Postmarket Data Collection for 
Devices Subject to Premarket Approval: Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration 
Staff, 9 (2015), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/u
cm393994.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MUS-UQWS]. 
76.  Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 1143. 
77.  Id. at 1153-54. 
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clinical use in the course of health care.78  Moreover, clinical use is unlikely to 
proceed in the absence of insurance coverage, making insurance coverage 
important to spur innovation. 
Therein lies the Catch-22 for unregulated NGS genetic testing: insurers will 
not pay for testing unless the results have validated clinical significance.79  Drug 
companies will pay for premarket validation of the relatively small number of 
mutations that allow them to get targeted therapies approved by the FDA.  But 
beyond these “druggable” mutations, drug companies have less interest in 
understanding the clinical significance of the much larger universe of variants 
in genes that play a role in cancer.  Because many of these variants are relatively 
rare, it is not economically feasible to study them in premarket clinical trials on 
the scale that drug companies typically undertake in pursuit of FDA approval.80  
Studies in much larger populations of patients are necessary to correlate these 
variants with health outcomes in order to validate their clinical significance, a 
job better done in observational studies in the course of clinical care.81  But 
clinical care will not happen without insurance coverage.  Validation requires 
use in clinical care, use in clinical care requires insurance coverage, and 
insurance coverage requires validation.82 
This dilemma highlights an important function of FDA regulation that goes 
far towards explaining why innovators might seek FDA approval for new 
technologies that they are free to market without that approval: the FDA 
performs a technology assessment function that public and private insurers rely 
on in deciding what they will pay for.83  For public insurance such as Medicare, 
federal law authorizes payment for “reasonable and necessary” care.84  Centers 
for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) regulations interpret this language 
to exclude “experimental” care.85  Private insurance policies often include 
similar language, and private insurers often follow the lead of Medicare in 
deciding what they will cover, although they need not do so as a matter of law.86 
“Reasonable and necessary” care under the laws governing Medicare 
coverage is not necessarily the same thing as “safe” and “effective” care under 
 
78.  Eisenberg & Varmus, supra note 67, at 1133. 
79.  Id. 
80.  Id. at 1134. 
81.  Id. 
82.  Id. at 1133. 
83.  Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 1154. 
84.  42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A). 
85.  42 C.F.R. § 411.15(o). 
86.  James D. Chambers et al., Private Payers Disagree with Medicare Over Medical Device 
Coverage About Half the Time, 34 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1376, 1382 (2015). 
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the laws administered by the FDA.87  Nonetheless, for the most part, health 
insurers provide coverage of FDA-approved technologies, although they may 
require prior authorization when cheaper alternatives are available.88  
Sometimes federal or state law mandates require them to cover these products,89 
and sometimes they are simply avoiding the burden of conducting their own 
technology assessment by relying on the FDA’s determinations. 
This is a significant benefit of FDA approval that may explain why 
innovators such as Foundation Medicine and MSKCC decided voluntarily to 
submit their products to FDA regulation even though they are not required to 
do so.  Perhaps they hoped that FDA approval would serve as a good enough 
proxy for clinical utility to persuade insurers to pay for testing. This is 
particularly clear in the case of Foundation Medicine, which took advantage of 
a coordinated parallel review process that involves overlapping review of some 
new technologies by FDA and CMS in order to facilitate earlier access to new 
technologies for Medicare beneficiaries.90 
As I noted earlier, Foundation Medicine and MSKCC pursued different 
regulatory pathways for similar tests at FDA.  Foundation Medicine chose the 
more arduous pathway.  They sought FDA approval of their test as a Class III 
medical device, calling it a “companion diagnostic” that was intended to be 
used “to identify patients who may benefit from treatment with” a list of 
targeted therapies previously approved by FDA “in accordance with the 
approved therapeutic product labeling,” as well as for “tumor mutation 
profiling . . . by qualified health care professionals in accordance with 
professional guidelines.”91  MSKCC asked FDA to classify their test as a Class 
II device,92 allowing use of the less arduous “premarket clearance” or “510(k)” 
process.93  To approve this classification, FDA had to determine that the lesser 
regulatory controls applicable to Class II devices were sufficient to ensure that 
the device was safe and effective for its intended use.94  MSKCC characterized 
 
87.  Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 1151. 
88.  42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(1)(A). 
89.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(2) (requiring state Medicaid programs that choose to cover 
drug to cover all FDA-approved drugs, with limited exceptions); 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(t)(2)(B) (requiring 
health insurers to cover all FDA-approved cancer drugs); 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-104(b)(3) (allowing 
private insurers that provide prescription drug coverage under Medicare Part D to determine which 
drugs within a therapeutic class to include in preferred formularies). 
90.  Food and Drug Admin., Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Serv., and Health & Human 
Services, Program for Parallel Review of Medical Devices, Fed. Reg. 81, 73113, 73114 (Oct. 24, 
2016). 
91.  Philip Letter Foundation, supra note 63. 
92.  Philip Letter MSKCC, supra note 63. 
93.  Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act 510(k), codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360(k). 
94.  21 U.S.C. 360c(a). 
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its product as a “tumor profiling test” that is intended “for use by qualified 
health care professionals in accordance with professional guidelines,” but 
unlike Foundation Medicine they did not call it a “companion diagnostic,” 
instead indicating that it is “not conclusive or prescriptive for labeled use of 
any specific therapeutic product.”95  FDA gave each applicant the approval or 
clearance it sought.  But the difference between FDA’s approval for the 
Foundation One test as a “companion diagnostic” and clearance for the 
MSKCC test as a “tumor profiling test” seems to have made a big difference to 
CMS.96 
On the same day that FDA approved the Foundation One test as a 
companion diagnostic, CMS issued a proposed national coverage determination 
for “Next Generation Sequencing for Medicare Beneficiaries with Advanced 
Cancer,” opening up a window for the submission of public comments.97  Under 
part A of that proposed decision, CMS would authorize Medicare coverage of 
NGS testing for Medicare beneficiaries with advanced cancer who have not 
previously had the same test if the test is “an FDA-approved companion in vitro 
diagnostic” and “used in a cancer with an FDA-approved companion diagnostic 
indication.”98  That was sufficient to provide Medicare coverage for the 
Foundation One test, because it is an FDA-approved companion diagnostic.  
But the MSKCC test was a tumor-profiling test, not a companion diagnostic.99  
Moreover, as a Class II device, it was technically “cleared” through a 
“premarket notification” process rather than “FDA-approved.”100  For products 
that are not companion diagnostics and that are merely “FDA-cleared” rather 
than “FDA-approved,” CMS proposed more limited coverage under Part B of 
its proposed decision.101  Under Part B, CMS proposed to authorize “coverage 
with evidence development,” or CED, only for patients enrolled in certain 
clinical trials or data registries.102 
 
95.  Philip Letter MSKCC, supra note 63. 
96.  See Philip Letter MSKCC, supra note 63 (noting the device should be classified as Class 
II); See Philip Letter Foundation, supra note 63 (noting the test should be classified as Class III). 
97.  Philip Letter Foundation, supra note 64. See Center for Medicare & Medicaid Serv., 
Proposed Decision Memo for Next Generation Sequencing (NGS) for Medicare Beneficiaries with 
Advanced Cancer (November 30, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/medicare-coverage-
database/details/nca-proposed-decision-
memo.aspx?NCAId=290&bc=AAAAAAAAAAQAAA%3D%3D [https://perma.cc/3HVB-V9FY]. 
98.  Id.; Center for Medicare & Medicaid Serv., Decision Memo for Next Generation 
Sequencing (NGS) for Medicare Beneficiaries with Advanced Cancer (March 16, 2018), 
https://www.cms.gov/medicare-coverage-database/details/nca-decision-
memo.aspx?NCAId=290&bc=AAAAAAAAACAA& [https://perma.cc/B5PZ-H2CU]. 
99.  See Philip Letter MSKCC, supra note 63. 
100.  21 U.S.C. § 360c et seq. (requiring only Class III devices go through pre market approval). 
101.  Center for Medicare & Medicaid Serv., Proposed Decision Memo (November 30, 2017). 
102.  Id. 
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CED is an interesting innovation that provides Medicare funding for some 
experimental technologies, but only for use in ongoing studies.  The goal of 
CED is to collect data to permit later evaluation of the technology so that CMS 
can make a more informed decision about coverage.103  CED is an interesting 
departure from the traditional refusal of insurers to pay for research that would 
permit insurers to conduct their own technology assessment on the effects of 
healthcare technologies in clinical use.  So far, it has mostly been used for new 
medical procedures that do not require FDA approval, like autologous bone 
marrow transplants for cancer patients.  Sometimes the result has been to 
generate data that prevented costly and toxic new technologies from becoming 
the standard of care.104  For NGS genetic testing, CED could provide a solution 
to the Catch-22 problem that arises when insurance coverage is necessary to 
achieve data collection on a meaningful scale to determine the clinical 
significance of rare genetic variants.  The data collected in patient registries if 
testing were provided under CED would be a valuable resource for cancer 
researchers, in addition to its value in assessing clinical outcomes for patients 
that get testing. 
Nonetheless, from the perspective of the laboratories that provide testing, 
CED is clearly inferior to full coverage not limited to those patients willingly 
participating in clinical trials or registries.  Many patients and caregivers that 
are interested in genetic testing of their tumors can be expected to prefer to use 
an FDA-approved test that Medicare will cover without further requirements 
rather than an otherwise similar test that will be covered only if they are willing 
to serve as research subjects and make their data available to researchers.  The 
difference in treatment would thus make it advantageous for other testing 
laboratories to follow the more arduous regulatory path of Foundation 
Medicine, seeking premarket approval of their tests as Class III companion 
diagnostic products, rather than the less arduous regulatory path taken by 
MSKCC, which sought premarket clearance for their test as a Class II tumor 
 
103.  Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Serv., Guidance for the Public, Industry, and CMS 
Staff: Coverage with Evidence Development (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.cms.gov/medicare-
coverage-database/details/medicare-coverage-document-details.aspx?MCDId=27 
[https://perma.cc/NM77-3ADL]. 
104.  See, e.g., CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., DECISION MEMO FOR LUNG 







AAABAAIAAA& (explaining LVRS is appropriate for only certain patients) 
[https://perma.cc/GLW3-LN73]. 
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profiling test.  The proposed decision could thus be expected to lead innovators 
to opt for heightened FDA regulation, even though they are not legally required 
to incur this more costly burden. 
After receiving hundreds of comments on its proposed decision, CMS 
modified its final national coverage determination to eliminate the provision 
for CED and to provide full coverage for both “FDA-cleared” and “FDA-
approved” tests.105  But the final decision retains the limitation on coverage to 
“companion diagnostics,” thus excluding nationwide coverage of the MSKCC 
test that FDA cleared as a “tumor profiling test,” although regional Medicare 
Administrative Contractors may provide coverage of other NGS tests within 
their territories if they so choose.106  As modified, the decision no longer steers 
innovators towards a more costly regulatory pathway than FDA requires, so 
long as the FDA is willing to affirm the utility of the test as a companion 
diagnostic.107 
The decision memo reads like an exercise in technology assessment by 
CMS to determine whether NGS testing in cancer patients meets its standards 
for reasonably and necessary care.108  It devotes many pages to reviewing the 
published literature on the clinical utility of NGS testing for cancer patients.109  
Yet little use is made of this bibliography to support the terms of the final 
national coverage determination.110  In the end, it appears that CMS’s coverage 
decision rests more on FDA’s technology assessment than on its own.111 
CONCLUSION 
In addition to its role as a regulatory of new medical technologies, FDA 
plays an important role in technology assessment. FDA approval or clearance 
of a new technology makes doctors and patients more willing to use it and 
insurers more willing to pay for it, even when the FDA would otherwise do 
nothing to stop the technology from reaching the market.  Although public and 
 
105.  Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Serv., Decision Memo for Net Generation Sequencing 
(NGS) for Medicare Beneficiaries with Advanced Cancer (CAG-00450N), 3 (March 16, 2018), 
https://www.cms.gov/medicare-coverage-database/details/nca-decision-memo.aspx?NCAId=290 
[hereinafter Final CMS Decision Memo] [https://perma.cc/KKM2-9YEE]. 
106.  Id. 
107.  The Final CMS Decision Memo notes that after it released its proposed decision, FDA 
“cleared” a companion diagnostic as a Class II device, indicating FDA’s willingness to use this 
pathway for companion diagnostics with appropriate evidence. Id. at 102. 
108.  Id. at 12–68 (reviewing various articles on clinical trials involving NGS for cancer 
treatment). 
109.  Id. 
110.  Id. at 3 (stating that coverage expands to those tests that have received FDA approval or 
clearance). 
111.  Id. 
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private insurers could and sometimes do perform their own technology 
assessment, it is often cheaper and easier to free ride on the work done by FDA.  
The willingness of CMS to provide Medicare coverage for FDA-approved or 
FDA-cleared NGS genetic tests suggests it is comfortable giving great 
deference to FDA’s technology assessment.  Although CMS considered using 
CED to get more data on the clinical utility of NGS testing for cancer patients, 
it ultimately decided not to bother.  This may have been a missed opportunity 
to collect more data that could improve cancer care for the Medicare 
population. 
This case study sheds an interesting light on the interacting regulatory 
regimes that set the stage for biomedical innovation.  Patent law is often a 
crucial part of the regulatory environment that supports biomedical innovation, 
but not always.  With or without patents, innovators cannot make money unless 
new technologies are adopted.  In the healthcare context, this means persuading 
caregivers to prescribe new products, and persuading insurers to cover them. 
Sometimes federal and state laws mandate insurance coverage for certain kinds 
of care, such as FDA-approved cancer drugs, but sometimes it is up to public 
and private insurers to decide what counts as reasonable and necessary care.  
Yet even when they are free to make their own coverage determinations, 
insurers may prefer to rely on the assessments of trusted regulators. This may 
lead innovators to seek regulatory approval even when regulators do not require 
it. 
You have to look beyond patent law to understand the rules that determine 
how innovators will pay for the development of new technologies, even within 
the patent law heartland of biomedical innovation.  For now, at least, the end of 
patents on diagnostics does not seem to mean the end of innovation in this 
important field.  And surprisingly, regulatory entry barriers may prove to be a 
part of the solution rather than a part of the problem. 
 
